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Abstract 
The EMS crisis of the 1990s illustrated the importance of a lack of confidence in price or 
exchange rate stability, whereas the present crisis illustrates the importance of a lack of 
confidence in fiscal sustainability. Theoretically the difference between the two should be 
minor since, in terms of the real return to an investor, the loss of purchasing power can be 
the same when inflation is unexpectedly high, or when the nominal value of government 
debt is cut in a formal default. Experience has shown, however, that expropriation via a 
formal default is much more disruptive than via inflation. 
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The EMS Crisis of the 1990s 
Parallels with the present crisis? 
Daniel Gros* 
CEPS Working Document No. 393 / March 2014 
Introduction 
The crisis in the European Monetary System (EMS) of the mid-1990s was considered at the 
time as posing an existential threat to the process of monetary integration. For a while it 
seemed that the markets (and the sceptics) had won in the sense that in 1993 the EMS had de 
facto been abandoned with the widening of the bands of fluctuations to ±15%. But the crisis 
also provided a stark illustration of the problems that can arise when capital is mobile and 
exchange rates are set by market pressures. In the end the crisis thus reinforced the 
determination of policy-makers to implement the Maastricht Treaty, which had been signed 
just before the crisis broke. 
At the time it was argued that countries like Italy (or Spain) with a weak reputation for price 
stability had a strong interest in entering the EMU because this would deliver lower interest 
rates. The argument was that by joining the single currency, Italy could convince financial 
markets that it would not use the printing press to inflate away the value of its debt and 
hence benefit from lower risk premia.  
Oddly enough, the opposite argument is often used today: Some argue that Italy and Spain 
have to pay a high risk premium because they have lost the option to use the printing press.  
The common thread in these two arguments is that a self-fulfilling crisis can arise under both 
scenarios. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the higher interest burden could exceed the willingness of 
the public to pay taxes, thus pushing the country into default if interest rates stay too high.  
This paper starts by providing a brief review of the EMS crisis, emphasising that the most 
interesting period might be the ‘post-EMS’ crisis of 1993-95. It then reviews in section 2 the 
crisis factors, comparing the EMS crisis to today’s euro crisis.  Section 3 outlines the main 
analytical issue, namely the potential instability of high public debt within and outside a 
monetary union.  Section 4 then compares the pressure on public finance coming from the 
crises for the case of Italy.  Section 5 uses data on ‘foreign currency’ debt to disentangle 
expectations of devaluation/inflation from expectations of default.  Section 6 concludes. 
                                                   
* Daniel Gros is Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. This paper was 
prepared for the Conference on “Progress through crisis?”, organised jointly by the National Bank of 
Belgium and the European Central Bank, 12 February 2014, to mark the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of the establishment of the European Monetary Institute. The paper will be published by 
the ECB and the NBB in a forthcoming collective volume. The author gratefully acknowledges 
financial support for his research from the Belgian Federal Science Office, in connection with the 
‘Beldebt’ project. 
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1. The EMS crisis – a brief review 
The EMS (European Monetary System) had been set up in 1979 to create a ‘zone of monetary 
stability’ in Europe. It was essentially a ‘fixed but adjustable’ system of exchange rates with a 
grid of bilateral ‘central’ rates at its heart, with fluctuation margins of ±2.25% – the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM). These exchange rates were supposed to be defended by both sides 
with interventions of potentially unlimited amounts. The institutional and operational set-up 
underpinning the EMS (see Gros and Thygesen, 1998, for more detail summary) did not 
change substantially over its lifetime (essentially 1979–93), but the way the system was 
managed had to evolve in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as capital movements were 
progressively liberalised as part of the internal market or ‘1992’ programme. With free 
capital movements, the system became vulnerable to speculative attacks whenever the 
market expected discrete changes in exchange rates changes and national central banks could 
no longer control their domestic (short-term) interest rates. See De Grauwe and Ji (2013) for 
an in-depth analysis of short-term and long-term interest rates during the EMS. 
By 1992 there had not been any change in parity ‘realignment’ since 1987, although prices 
and wage competitiveness indicators had diverged considerably between Germany and its 
main partners. At the same time, Germany experienced considerable inflationary pressures 
in the aftermath of the boom created by unification. 
The need for a realignment appeared obvious to some (especially the Bundesbank), but it 
was resisted by others and badly managed. It proved impossible to agree on ‘maxi 
realignment’ to re-establish competiveness in an orderly way and the Bundesbank refused to 
engage in unlimited intervention as price stability in Germany seemed at stake. The result 
was that two major currencies – the lira and the pound sterling – left the system (formally 
only the Exchange Rate Mechanism or ERM) – in September 1992, in the midst of public 
recriminations among major policy-makers. (Annex 1provides a brief discussion of why the 
events of the 1992 pound meant the end of the crisis for the UK, but only the beginning of a 
more acute phase for Spain.) 
However, even after the partial break-up in 1992, the strain on the remaining participants 
persisted. The most visible sign of these difficulties were the continuing large interventions 
at the margin, which were necessary to keep the exchange rates of the remaining participants 
within the normal margins of fluctuations. Public disagreement among major policy-makers 
contributed to unsettling markets. Bundesbank officials insisted on their duty to preserve 
price stability in Germany, which, in their view, limited their ability to intervene or to lower 
interest rates. Important policy-makers from France and other countries argued that 
Germany had undertaken a precise commitment to defend the EMS and that its policy-
makers should take the overall European economic context into account in setting policy for 
the country.  
From today’s point of view, it is important to note that doubts about the sustainability of 
public finances were not among the many factors that were held responsible for the 
problems at the time: apparent overvaluation of some participating currencies, German 
unification and the associated distortions in the German policy mix, doubts about the 
feasibility of EMU in the light of the difficulties of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in several 
member states, and the weakness of the US dollar. Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is 
difficult to disentangle the relative importance of these factors, but until 1993 the 
sustainability of public finances did not figure importantly in official discussions or market 
commentary. 
As the tensions continued into 1993, and the Bundesbank remained reluctant to continue its 
interventions, the system could no longer be defended: the margins of fluctuations were 
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increased to ±15% at the end of a dramatic ECOFIN meeting on 31 July–1 August. This led to 
a temporary calm in markets as the risk for speculators had become more two-sided. But 
after a more stable 1994, the turbulences resumed in 1995. The peseta and the lira were then 
the main targets. At one point in 1995 the lira had depreciated by more than 60% relative to 
its 1992 DM EMS parity and the differential on longer-term interest rates increased to over 
6%. It is during this ‘post-ERM’ crisis period that public finance issues came to the forefront 
of market concerns and policy discussions. It is this period that might contain lessons for 
today’s crisis. 
2. Crisis factors 
The focus of this contribution will thus be on this ‘post-ERM’ period, with particular 
attention on Italy and Spain (and to some extent Portugal) because these were the key 
countries for the EMS.  
As mentioned above, the higher inflation rates in the EMS ‘periphery’ had led to a gradual 
erosion of their competitiveness. Different indictors (unit labour costs, relative CPIs, etc.) 
gave somewhat different numerical results, but whatever loss of competitiveness had 
accumulated during the tranquil period from 1987 to 1992, it had been compensated by the 
realignments and devaluations by 1993.  
At any rate, the external disequilibria were minor by comparison to today, both in terms of 
flows and stocks. By 1993 the current account of Italy was in a small surplus and that of 
Spain was in a deficit of only 1% of GDP. Moreover, neither country had a history of large 
current account deficits as can be seen by the fact that their net external position (proxied by 
the cumulated current account balances up to 1993) was very small.  
By contrast, Spain was running a current account deficit of close to 10% of GDP in 2008 and 
that of Portugal was even larger. 
Figure 1. External position and current account in Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 
1993 and 2008 
 
Source: AMECO, 2014. 
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Public finance became the key issue after 1993, but even here the situation looked less 
alarming compared to today. The debt ratios were actually much lower than today, except 
for Italy, which already at the time had a higher debt. 
Fiscal deficits, however, were even higher than today.  But part of this was due to higher 
inflation (which meant that part of interest expenditure in reality was a reconstitution of the 
real value of the debt). Italy had no primary deficit at the start of the crisis (1991) and its 
primary balance kept on improving until it reached close to 4% of GDP at the height of the 
crisis in 1995. The present crisis shows a very similar pattern with Italy starting in 2010 with 
an approximate primary balance and now a surplus of about 3% of GDP. 
The primary balance of Portugal was somewhat more variable, but it was also in surplus for 
most the turbulent period (whereas at the outset of the present crisis, Portugal started with a 
primary deficit of 7% of GDP). 
Figure 2. Gross public debt and primary public deficits in Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 
1993 and 2010/1 
  
Source: AMECO, 2014. 
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justify central banks’ interventions in the market, for example, the OMT (outright monetary 
transactions), which have been widely credited as having stopped the crisis. 
However, the EMS crisis of the 1990s had prompted a similar resurgence of the view that 
self-fulfilling speculative attacks could be destabilising. The first leg of the EMS crisis seemed 
to justify the models of self-fulfilling speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates. But the 
‘post-EMS’ (1993-95) experience of Italy led to an application of these models to public 
finances. These models were actually used to justify the creation of EMU with an 
independent central bank. The reasoning was very similar: If the market suspects the country 
will abandon the commitment to price stability, it will ask for a high-risk premium (a high 
nominal rate of interest). But if the rate of interest is very high, the government will find it 
very difficult to keep the commitment to price stability because this would imply very high 
ex-post real interest rates and a correspondingly high burden to service the public debt.1 The 
strength of this mechanism depends of course on the size of the public debt (relative to 
GDP). 
Countries with a high level of debt thus seem to have only bad choices: if they enter a 
monetary union a speculative attack can force them to default. But if they keep monetary 
autonomy a speculative attack can force them into high inflation.  
Calvo (1988) confirms this: he considers both the case of a country with monetary autonomy 
and the case when it does not. He finds that multiple equilibria can arise in both cases. He 
also finds that in both cases the high interest-rate equilibrium is Pareto inferior. 
This result is not surprising. From the point of view of investors it should not really matter 
whether the government defaults on its obligations and imposes a haircut on investors or 
whether it is forced into high inflation, which then reduces the real value of the debt 
securities they hold, even without a formal default.  
Assume for instance that within a monetary union, the probability of a default of a member 
country is 1/5 and that the haircut in case of default is 20%. This would justify an interest 
rate premium (over the riskless rate) of 4 percentage points. If the country had kept its own 
currency, the risk of abandoning the hard currency policy might also be 1/5 and the inflation 
rate, in case the hard currency option is abandoned, might be also 20%. This would also 
require for a risk-neutral investor an additional compensation (risk premium) of 4 
percentage points. The risk (and thus its price) should be the same under both circumstances: 
being part of a monetary area or having one’s own currency.  
One could of course argue that, at least for a euro area member country, both the cost of 
defaulting on government debt and that of exiting the euro area would be much higher than 
the cost of merely exiting a fixed exchange-rate regime (and permitting inflation to increase 
to higher levels). However, the usual models of speculative attacks would then also imply 
                                                   
1 This mechanism in turn is similar to the one for a fixed exchange rate system. According to Adrian & 
Gros (1999), a “fixed exchange rate regime can experience a self-fulfilling crisis if a high risk premium 
leads to high domestic interest rates that depress domestic activity, and thus make it more likely that 
the government will actually abandon the system. Depending on the parameter configuration, two 
equilibria might exist. One is characterized by low interest rates and a low (possibly zero) probability 
that the exchange rate commitment will be abandoned; the other is characterized by high interest rates 
and a high probability that the exchange rate commitment will be abandoned.” This quote refers to the 
analysis of a country under a fixed exchange regime, but it also applies to the case of a free-floating 
exchange rate. The debt burden in both cases would be reduced through inflation; the difference is 
that under the fixed regime there is first a currency crisis and the exit from the hard peg regime. A 
number of other authors arrived at similar conclusions (see Obstfeld (1995) and the further references 
provided by Gros (2011). 
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that, given the much higher cost of defaulting, the credibility of the government not to 
default should be much higher and consequently the likelihood of multiple equilibria much 
lower. This was indeed one argument widely used to illustrate the advantages of giving up 
one’s currency. 
The practical argument that speculative attacks can in reality only be of limited importance 
remains the same today. It is simply the fact that only a relatively small portion of public 
debt has to be refinanced at any point in time. For example, with an average maturity of 
seven years even a country with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 130% of GDP needs to re-finance 
‘only’ less than 20% of its GDP every year. This implies that a speculative ‘attack’ would 
have to persist for some time before it would result in higher debt-service costs. This could 
also be observed in Italy during the 2011-12 crisis: although the interest rate reached at times 
7% (for longer maturities), the actual average debt service costs moved very little.  
A key aspect of the models of multiple equilibria is that even if investors demand higher 
interest rates to hold the public debt because they expect either inflation or a default, the 
government is not forced to validate these expectations. It can increase taxes or reduce 
expenditure to pay for these higher interest rates. This is indeed what happened during the 
‘post-ERM’ crisis period. But not validating the expectations of either default or high 
inflation comes at a cost: ex post, the cost of servicing public debt is very high. 
Ex ante, it is impossible to say under which regime the ex-post cost of not validating the 
doubt of investors concerning the sustainability of public finances is lower. This depends on 
the nominal risk premium demanded by investors and the debt-to-GDP ratio.  Differences 
between these key variables might decisively affect any comparison between regimes. But a 
comparison between the 1990s and today is instructive. 
4. The case of Italy 
Let us first consider the case of Italy. Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio is today about 130%, only 
somewhat higher than the 120% of GDP reached already during the post-EMS crisis of the 
1990s. In this respect there is thus little difference between today and the EMS crisis period. 
Annex 2 shows that Belgium had an even higher debt ratio than Italy during the 1990s, but 
paid much lower interest rates. In this sense it is surprising that Italy was affected by the post-
EMS crisis, but Belgium almost not at all. It is easier to understand why Belgium was not 
affected by the euro crisis because at that point Belgium had a much lower debt-to-GDP ratio 
owing to the fact that it had continued to maintain substantial primary surpluses during the 
first, calm, decade of the euro. 
Given the debt-to-GDP ratio, the key indicator for the sustainability of government debt is 
then the difference between the borrowing cost and the growth rate of GDP, which is often 
also called the ‘snowball factor’. If the interest rate is higher than the growth rate, the debt-
to-GDP ratio will continue to grow and eventually explode unless the country continuously 
runs a primary surplus.  
In the multiple equilibrium view of the world, a speculative attack starts when the ‘risk 
premium’, i.e. the difference between the risk-free rate and the borrowing cost of the country 
in question increases. How threatening an attack then is can be measured by the size of this 
snowball factor (multiplied by the debt/GDP ratio), but this parameter was about the same 
in both the ESM and the present crisis). 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the ‘snowball effect’ measured by the difference between the 
long-term interest rate on Italian government debt and the growth rate of nominal GDP 
(realised over the preceding twelve months). It is apparent that the country was under 
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extreme stress during the wave of speculative ‘attacks’ of the early 1990s. In 1993, when the 
authorities were still defending the peg within the ERM, the difference between the 
(nominal) interest rate and the growth rate of (nominal) GDP was over 10 percentage points. 
The snowball effect then declined after the country left the ERM, but it disappeared 
gradually only as it became more and more likely that Italy would join EMU. 
Figure 3 also suggests that the sharp fall in nominal GDP right after the Lehman collapse 
induced a short-lived spike in the snowball effect, which was apparently discounted by the 
financial markets because of its temporary nature.  
A comparison of this period of flexible exchange rates to the euro crisis suggests that the 
speculative pressures are less acute today: the snow-ball factor remains, at around 2-3 
percentage points, much below the level of the early 1990s and the peak reached in 2012 
remains much below the peak of the 1990s. The spread on German government securities 
(the benchmark risk-free rate) would have to double for the snowball effect to reach the same 
level of tension as 15 years ago. Moreover, interest on public debt now accounts for about 5% 
of GDP, which again is less than one-half than it was during the 1990s and it would take 
several years before high interest rates would translate into materially higher interest 
expenditure for the government. 
Figure 3. Italy: Snow-ball factor (interest rate minus growth of GDP) 1990-2011 and S&P ratings 
history  
 
Note: The snow-ball factor is defined as the difference between the interest rate on 10-year government bonds and 
the actual nominal growth rate.  
Source: Own calculations on ECB and Commission Services (Ameco) and Standard & Poor’s. 
The nature of the speculative pressures during the post EMS-crisis period can be illustrated 
by looking at the pricing of the foreign currency debt of Italy, compared to its ‘national’ 
currency debt. 
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5. Default versus inflation 
It is generally assumed that during the 1990s the difference between ITL and DM interest 
rates reflected expectations regarding the future evolution of exchange rates (which in turn, 
at least in the long run, are usually supposed to be equivalent to differences in inflation 
rates). However, the government of Italy could also have defaulted formally on its debt even 
it was denominated in Italian lira. Reinhard and Rogoff (2009) show that defaults on 
domestic currency debt are rare, but they do occur. 
There is way to disentangle the devaluation/inflation risk from the risk of a formal default. 
The government of Italy had debt also outstanding in other currencies, notably the USD. The 
risk premium the Italian government paid on its USD debt (i.e. the rate paid by the Italian 
government minus the rate paid by the US government, which presumably reflects the 
riskless rate in USD) should thus provide evidence on the likelihood.  
Since the start of EMU, all Italian government debt is denominated in euro. The difference 
between the interest rate of debt issued by the German government and that issued by the 
Italian government during the euro crisis presumably reflected only expectations of default, 
as both governments now issue debt in the same currency. In this context it does not matter 
whether this default takes the form of a ‘hair cut’ or whether the country leaves the euro 
area. 
The pricing of the Italian USD-denominated debt during the 1990s compared to today can 
thus be used to infer the probability of a formal default. The two figures below show the co-
movements of the USD spread to the ‘national currency’ spread during the 1990s and the 
euro crisis. (The national currency spread refers to ITL- versus DEM-denominated debt for 
the 1990s and to euro versus USD debt during the euro crisis.) 
A simple comparison of the two figures below shows the key difference between the 1990s 
('national currencies' DM and ITL) and the euro crisis (‘national currency’= euro). 
During both turbulent periods,2 there was a strong correlation between the risk premia on 
debt denominated in USD and the ‘national currency’, but there was one key difference: 
during the 1990s, an increase in the difference between ITL and DM interest rates of 1 point 
led to an increase in the risk premium on Italian USD-denominated debt of only 0.15 points. 
By contrast, during the euro crisis an increase in the spread on Italian euro-denominated 
debt was accompanied by an increase in the spread on USD-denominated debt of also 1 full 
point. The spread on USD dollar debt follows one to one the spread on euro-denominated 
debt. In other words, the market is pricing euro-denominated debt as ‘foreign currency’ debt. 
  
                                                   
2 During the credit boom period with low risk aversion, both spreads were an order of magnitude 
lower and the correlation fell to about 20% (with negative values at times). 
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Figure 4. ‘Foreign currency’ and ‘domestic currency’ risk premia compared 
  
The data from the 1990s thus suggest that for financial markets the probability of a formal 
default on public debt is much lower than the probability that the government lets the 
exchange rate and inflation increase. This in turn suggests that the political and economic 
costs of a formal default are perceived to be much higher than the cost of breaking an 
exchange rate commitment or allowing higher inflation. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The overall conclusion one should draw from the experience of the EMS and post-EMS crisis 
of the 1990s is that a highly indebted country has nowhere to hide. If it keeps a national 
exchange rate, it is subject to potentially self-fulfilling speculative attacks on its exchange rate 
and government bond market. If it enters a monetary union, it is still subject to potentially 
self-fulfilling attacks on its government bond market and has to rely on liquidity support 
from somewhere else.  
The break-up of the EMS in 1993 constitutes a ‘red herring’. The fact that it proved 
impossible to defend a fixed exchange rate system with open capital markets does not imply 
that floating exchange rates insulate against speculative attacks on government bond 
markets. The subsequent experience (especially Italy’s in 1995) showed that even when the 
exchange is floating, a highly indebted country can still be forced to pay very high risk 
premia. 
A review of the EMS (Gros and Thygesen, 1998) stated: “There are two types of mistake that 
an exchange-rate system must attempt to avoid. The first is to defend rates that are perceived 
by markets to be misaligned; the second is to give in to speculative pressures when rates are 
in good correspondence with fundamentals.”  
The euro crisis suggests that a similar conclusion might be appropriate for the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM): 
There are two types of mistake that a Stability Mechanism must avoid. The first is to provide 
financing to countries with public debt that are perceived by markets as unsustainable; the 
second is to give in to speculative pressures when public finances are fundamentally sound. 
The key question that remains at the analytical level is thus: What mechanisms make a 
formal default with a haircut different from debt monetisation followed by inflation.  
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Annex: Two vignettes 
Annex 1. ‘Teflon’ UK?  
Comparisons of the experience of the UK with that of Spain have been used recently to 
illustrate the advantage of having a national currency (Kopf, 2011 and de Grauwe, 2011). 
Interestingly enough, a comparison of the same couple of countries during the 1990s shows a 
similar pattern. The UK pound left the ERM in 1992 (along with Italian lira), whereas the 
Spanish peseta remained although its central rate against the DM was repeatedly realigned, 
leading in the end to an even-larger devaluation than that of the pound. It is thus difficult to 
argue that Spain’s formal membership of the ERM constituted a serious constraint. However, 
despite the fact that exchange rates were de facto flexible for both countries, there was a big 
difference in interest rates, which remained low and rather stable in the UK, whereas they 
were high and variable for Spain. 
The UK was also able to pursue an aggressive fiscal policy, letting the deficit increase to 
about 7% of GDP in 1994, without incurring any perceptible risk premium. In 1995, at the 
peak of the crisis, Spain and the UK had almost exactly the same primary deficit (slightly 
above 2% of GDP in both countries). There was also little difference in the public debt ratios, 
which in 1991 was only 43% of GDP in Spain, which was only 10 percentage points higher 
than in the UK.  
Given this similarity in the fiscal fundamentals, it is difficult to understand why the markets 
perceived Spain in such a different vein. (Ratings remained different. But even here the 
difference was not that large, with the UK remaining at triple A compared to a double A for 
Spain.) The UK appears to be more favourably perceived in the markets, which is 
independent of the exchange rate regime. 
 
Annex 2. The dog that did not bark: Belgium versus Italy 
Belgium is the one country conspicuous for its absence from the EMS crisis (except for a few 
months in 1995), although its public debt ratio was at the start of the crisis almost 30% higher 
than that of Italy (in 1991 Italy had a debt ratio below 100% of GDP, whereas that of Belgium 
was close to 130 % of GDP). In both countries the debt ratio increased during the turbulent 
period of 1991-195. But it increased much more in Italy, partially because Belgium was 
running somewhat larger primary surpluses, but also because Belgium had to pay much 
lower risk premia. The result of these two factors was that by the end of the 1990s the initial 
difference of 30% of GDP had been eliminated and the two countries went then into EMU 
with about the same debt/GDP ratios. 
Over most of the following decade there was little difference in the cost of servicing the debt 
between the two countries, but Belgium maintained a much larger primary surplus, 
especially during the good times of the early years of EMU. This proved to be an important 
investment since the debt-to-GDP ratio fell to 84%, which was one key reason why Belgium’s 
cost of debt service remained low even after the start of the euro crisis, whereas that of Italy 
rose. After two decades, the positions of the two countries are thus completely reversed: Italy 
is now where Belgium was in 1991 and Belgium is today where Italy was more than 20 years 
ago (see Figure A1). 
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Figure A1. Public debt/GDP ratio: Belgium vs Italy, 1998-2013 
 
Source: European Commission. 
 
The return to fiscal prudence or the price of profligacy  
During the period of low risk premia of the early 2000s, the return from lowering the debt 
ratio appeared minor. With an interest rate of around 2% in real terms, Belgium could expect 
to save interest payments worth only about 0.4% of GDP p.a.. The failure of Italy to reduce 
its debt ratio seemed thus to be of secondary importance. However, when the crisis broke, 
Italy had to pay a substantial risk premium on its entire debt, worth 100 % of GDP. If one 
assumes that this risk premium amounts to 2.5%, one could argue that Italy had to pay 2.5% 
of GDP more than Belgium simply because of its failure to reduce its debt ratio during the 
good times. For Belgium the return for its prudent policy was thus the riskless rate plus 
2.5/20, or an additional return of 12.5%. Ex post, Belgium thus made a higher profitable 
investment by reducing its debt ratio during the good times. Another way to look at these 
numbers is that Italy should have taken into account the potential consequences of a return 
of risk aversion and calculated a cost of public debt of 15%. This figure might actually have 
been even higher since this calculation is based only on the public finance aspect and does 
not take into account the loss of output caused by the public finance crisis in Italy.  
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